| Autor: |
Liang Zhang, Choffnes, David, Dumitras, Tudor, Levin, Dave, Mislove, Alan, Schulman, Aaron, Wilson, Christo |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Communications of the ACM; Mar2018, Vol. 61 Issue 3, p109-116, 8p, 1 Diagram, 7 Graphs |
| Abstrakt: |
A properly managed public key infrastructure (PKI) is critical to ensure secure communication on the Internet. Surprisingly, some of the most important administrative steps--in particular, reissuing new X.509 certificates and revoking old ones--are manual and remained unstudied, largely because it is difficult to measure these manual processes at scale. We use Heartbleed, a widespread OpenSSL vulnerability from 2014, as a natural experiment to determine whether administrators are properly managing their certificates. All domains affected by Heartbleed should have patched their software, revoked their old (possibly compromised) certificates, and reissued new ones, all as quickly as possible. We find the reality to be far from the ideal: over 73% of vulnerable certificates were not reissued and over 87% were not revoked three weeks after Heartbleed was disclosed. Our results also show a drastic decline in revocations on the weekends, even immediately following the Heartbleed announcement. These results are an important step in understanding the manual processes on which users rely for secure, authenticated communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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