| Abstrakt: |
The article investigates the problem of «ocularcenterism» in the Early Modern philosophy, which conceptualized the «visual epistemology». It is shown that the Early Modern optics, as a significant part of the intellectual practices of its time, distinguished Cartesian and Newtonian positions. Visual perception becomes the object of special interest in solving the problem of achieving reliable knowledge. The author focuses on the visual paradigm of epistemology presented in the philosophy of British empiricism. For empiricists, eyes are an ideal design that can’t be improved by any optical device. In the context of sight and vision, the problem of «light» is identified, which is equated with the obvious truth. In its turn, it is achieved by the activity of reason, which appears as the «light». The visual context mentioned in the article did not introduce a radical reorientation into the general position of British sensualism. The process of logical, intellectual cognition in empiricism is due to the general possibilities of perception, including the ability to look, to see, to perceive visually. Cognition is grounded in empiricism on the basis of direct data, including visual data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
