| Autor: |
TANEGA, JOSEPH, SAVI, ANDREA |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
New York University Journal of Law & Business; Spring2017, Vol. 13 Issue 3, p825-883, 59p |
| Abstrakt: |
Most academic analyses of the financial regulatory framework assume that clearing OTC derivatives via Central Counterparties (CCPs) represents the condicio sine qua non to mitigate the systemic risk. This Article offers a different and innovative paradigm for OTC-users. This unique model shows that (1) complexity and flexibility of OTC products leads the CCPs to adverse selection in terms of risk-pricing, and exacerbate the margin calls in volatile times; (2) a standardised regulation ossifies the financial system preventing the experimentation of new solutions and incrementing the fragility of the entire regulatory system against a high-impact event (so called "black swan"); (3) subsidizing and mutualising default losses meet the limits of the game theory, encouraging clearing members to additional risks and sub-optimal strategies. The authors intend to use these epistemological limits to criticise the mandate of clearing OTC transactions via central counterparties and, meanwhile, to characterize an efficient model of market clearing based on bilateral mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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