| Autor: |
Mostert, Irene, Veltrop, Dennis, van Veen, Paula, de Haan, Jakob |
| Zdroj: |
Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings; 2016, Vol. 2016 Issue 1, p1-1, 1p |
| Abstrakt: |
In this paper we examine how executives' tenure impacts board monitoring and board advice provision and we investigate how board vigilance and board tenure shield a board from the negative impact of executives' tenure. We find that the moderating effect of board vigilance is different for board monitoring and board advice provision; board vigilance diminishes the negative effects of executives' tenure on board monitoring, while it exacerbates the negative effects of executives' tenure on board advice provision. Furthermore, our results show that these interactive effects of executives' tenure and board vigilance are contingent on board tenure. Building on a unique multi-source dataset comprised of data from executive and non-executive board members of Dutch financial firms, our results underscore the complexities of board functioning and show that governance scholars and regulators should not solely focus on reducing tenure of executive and non-executive directors. Specifically, our findings demonstrate that a one-size-fits-all recommendation does not account for the complexities involving board functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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