| Abstrakt: |
I examine Richard Rorty's "justice as larger loyalty" proposal. He urges that we think of justice as a more capacious loyalty, rather than something altogether distinct from loyalty. While Rorty is right to reject the Kantian idea of a strict bifurcation between justice and loyalty, the former corresponding to reason the latter corresponding to sentiment, my argument is that it is nevertheless a mistake to follow Rorty in conceiving of justice as he recommends we should. This is not an endorsement of the rationalistic Kantian view Rorty rejects. Contrary to what Rorty sometimes implies, it is possible to be skeptical about the "justice as larger loyalty" thesis without thereby committing oneself to Kant's view. There are compelling Rortyan reasons for rejecting the "justice as larger loyalty" proposal, which are not merely compatible with Rorty's broader moral and political thinking, but paradoxically very much in its spirit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
