An ageless body does not imply transhumanism: A reply to Levin.
| Autor: | García-Barranquero P; Departament of Philosophy (Logic and Philosophy of Science), University of Malaga, Campus de Teatinos, 29010, Málaga, Spain. pablogarcia@uma.es., Llorca Albareda J; Department of Philosophy I (Moral and Political Philosophy), University of Granada, Campus de Cartuja, 18011, Granada, Spain. joanllorca@ugr.es. |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Zdroj: | Theoretical medicine and bioethics [Theor Med Bioeth] 2024 Dec; Vol. 45 (6), pp. 481-485. Date of Electronic Publication: 2024 Sep 14. |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11017-024-09685-z |
| Abstrakt: | Susan B. Levin argues that the human confidence that an ageless body would be better is irrational. She offers a Kantian-inspired argument to show that human understanding cannot rationally access the experiences of a post-human and ageless existence. We challenge this rationale with a three-step argument: first, an ageless body does not have to be post-human. One should distinguish between the transhumanist projects of life extension and accounts focused on enhancing well-being and quality of life. An existence without aging does not require a radical change in one's temporal intuitions, which makes rational discussion possible. Second, we defend that biological aging does not entail any valuable goods. These goods refer to the chronological dimension of aging. Finally, we argue that biological aging is indeed negative and one may need biotechnological interventions in aging to achieve internal transcendence. Thus, we rationally argue that an ageless body would be better. (© 2024. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.) |
| Databáze: | MEDLINE |
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