Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue.

Autor:	Lebkuecher G; Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China., Hornewer M; Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA., Roytman MV; Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, USA., Samoska S; Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, USA., Vukov JM; Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Jazyk:	angličtina
Zdroj:	The Journal of medicine and philosophy [J Med Philos] 2024 Nov 22; Vol. 49 (6), pp. 560-575.
DOI:	10.1093/jmp/jhae035
Abstrakt:	Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue-its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality-in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework-cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology. (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For commercial re-use, please contact reprints@oup.com for reprints and translation rights for reprints. All other permissions can be obtained through our RightsLink service via the Permissions link on the article page on our site—for further information please contact journals.permissions@oup.com.)
Databáze:	MEDLINE
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