Theoretical concepts as goal-derived concepts.

Autor: De Benedetto M; Ruhr-University of Bochum, Department of Philosophy II, Universitätsstrasse 150, 44780 Bochum, Germany. Electronic address: matteo.debenedetto@rub.de.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Studies in history and philosophy of science [Stud Hist Philos Sci] 2024 Oct; Vol. 107, pp. 82-91. Date of Electronic Publication: 2024 Sep 02.
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2024.08.004
Abstrakt: In this paper, I will focus on the nature of theoretical concepts, i.e., the psychological entities related to theoretical terms in science. I will first argue that the standard picture of theoretical concepts in twentieth-century philosophy of science understood them as representation-oriented common taxonomic concepts. However, I will show how, in light of recent pragmatist approaches to scientific laws and theories, several important theoretical concepts in science do not seem to fit such picture. I will then argue that these theoretical concepts should be understood instead as goal-derived concepts, since their construction and use exhibit the typical characteristics that cognitive scientists assign to goal-derived concepts. I will furthermore argue that the existence of theoretical concepts that are goal-derived concepts represents yet another example of the central role that human goals play in science.
Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
(Copyright © 2024 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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