Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups.

Autor: Payne B; Department of Psychology, King's College London, London, UK. bryony.payne@kcl.ac.uk., Bird G; Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.; Centre for Research in Autism and Education, Institute of Education, University College London, London, UK., Catmur C; Department of Psychology, King's College London, London, UK.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Scientific reports [Sci Rep] 2024 Aug 28; Vol. 14 (1), pp. 19432. Date of Electronic Publication: 2024 Aug 28.
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-024-67311-3
Abstrakt: Societies are becoming more polarised, driven in part by misconceptions about out-groups' beliefs. To understand these effects, one must examine the cognitive processes underlying how people think about others. Here, we investigate whether people are less prone to theorise about the minds of out-groups, or less able to do so. Participants (Study 1: n = 128; Study 2: n = 128) made inferences about social and political beliefs held by real in-group and out-group members, and could choose to receive further information to improve these inferences. Results show: (1) participants sought equivalent or greater information about out-groups relative to in-groups; but despite this, (2) made significantly less accurate inferences for out-groups; and (3) were significantly less aware of their reduced ability. This shows that poorer mental state inference is not underpinned by a reduced propensity to consider out-group minds, but instead by a worse representation of the minds of out-groups.
(© 2024. The Author(s).)
Databáze: MEDLINE
Externí odkaz:
Nepřihlášeným uživatelům se plný text nezobrazuje