Second verse, same as the first: learning generalizable relational concepts through functional repetition.

Autor: Mercado E 3rd; Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Park Hall, Buffalo, NY, 14260, USA. emiii@buffalo.edu.; Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior Program, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY, 14260, USA. emiii@buffalo.edu., Scagel A; Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Park Hall, Buffalo, NY, 14260, USA.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Animal cognition [Anim Cogn] 2023 Jan; Vol. 26 (1), pp. 141-151. Date of Electronic Publication: 2022 Oct 12.
DOI: 10.1007/s10071-022-01702-9
Abstrakt: The ability to learn and flexibly apply sophisticated concepts is thought by many to be what differentiates humans from all other animals. A basic assumption underlying this belief is that some "lower-order" associative learning mechanisms link perceptual events to specific reactions, whereas the kinds of verbalizable concepts that humans form depend on "higher-order" cognitive processes that rely less on perception and more on rational thought. Evidence in support of this interpretation comes largely from experiments in which animals either fail to learn or generalize concepts that humans readily learn, or learn them with great difficulty. Here, we argue that the formation of generalizable relational concepts may depend more on an individual's capacity to shift attention than on the possession of representational processes that are unique to humans. Studies of relational concept learning in non-human animals show that they can learn generalizable concepts when conditions are favorable. In particular, repetition of similar training experiences appears to facilitate attentional redirection, thereby enabling animals to flexibly reenact past events and to judge the similarity of items within stimulus sets. The conditions that promote concept learning in humans may differ substantially from those experienced by most other animals. This does not imply, however, that either (1) conceptual learning mechanisms differ qualitatively from other learning mechanisms, or (2) that the processes that lead to concept formation in humans differ significantly from those present in other species.
(© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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