| Autor: |
Smith JD; Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.; Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States., Jackson BN; Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.; Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States., Church BA; Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, United States.; Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Decatur, GA 30034, United States. |
| Abstrakt: |
The authors consider theory in the animal-metacognition literature. Theoretical interpretation was long dominated by associative descriptions, as illustrated in the 2009 special issue. We suggest that this approach risks a self-limiting understanding of animal mind, and an imprecise understanding of the cognitive requirements inherent in metacognition tasks. In fact, some tasks self-entail the need for higher-level decision-making processes, processes that-in humans-we would call explicit, declarative, and conscious. These points are illustrated using the inaugural study on dolphin metacognition. We urge researchers to turn more toward illuminating the cognitive architecture of capacities like metacognition, including illuminating the depth, and structure, the learning/memory systems, the cognitive levels, and the declarative awareness possibly present in animals' minds. The empirical development of this literature demonstrates that researchers are now prepared to do so. This study can produce strong synergies across the allied fields of biopsychology, comparative and cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. |
