Comparing theories of consciousness: Object position, not probe modality, reliably influences experience and accuracy in object recognition tasks.

Autor: Del Pin SH; Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. Electronic address: simon.dp@gmail.com., Skóra Z; Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland., Sandberg K; Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus C, Denmark., Overgaard M; Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus C, Denmark., Wierzchoń M; Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Consciousness and cognition [Conscious Cogn] 2020 Sep; Vol. 84, pp. 102990. Date of Electronic Publication: 2020 Aug 14.
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102990
Abstrakt: People often claim seeing images completely despite performing poorly. This highlights an issue with conscious representations. We introduce an experimental manipulation aiming to disentangle two prevalent positions: Rich views posit that people virtually represent the external world with unlimited capacity; Sparse views state that representations are reconstructed from expectations and information. In two experiments using the object recognition task, we tested two probe types: Images, which should aid reconstruction more, and Words, which should aid it less. From a sparse view, one should expect that Images lead to greater accuracy and reported experience. We found no reliable differences in accuracy and reported experience across probe types; however, we observed that the object positions influenced both accuracy and reported experience, which is surprising from a Rich view as it seemingly requires assumptions of different access across the visual field. Both theoretical positions thus currently need further development to explain our results.
(Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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