Being Deceived: Information Asymmetry in Second-Order False Belief Tasks.

Autor: Braüner T; Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University., Blackburn P; Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University., Polyanskaya I; Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Topics in cognitive science [Top Cogn Sci] 2020 Apr; Vol. 12 (2), pp. 504-534. Date of Electronic Publication: 2019 Aug 10.
DOI: 10.1111/tops.12422
Abstrakt: We analyze four well-known second-order false belief tasks. Superficially, all four tasks share a common logical structure: All are based around a principle of inertia, which says that an agent's beliefs are preserved over time, unless the agent receives information to the contrary. However, a deeper analysis reveals details that are both suggestive and puzzling. First, the four tasks exemplify all four possibilities inherent in the two dimensions of being-deceived versus not-being-deceived and change-in-world versus change-in-belief-only. Second, there is a feature common to all four tasks: All come with a "built in" first-order false belief. We call these inner first-order false beliefs. They introduce an informational asymmetry that has the same logical form in all four tasks, but whose role is unclear. We do two things in this paper. First, we show that inner first-order false beliefs play an important (though seemingly unremarked) role in the experimental design of the tasks. Second, we present some empirical results (for both typically developing children and children with Autism Spectrum Disorder) on the effects of being-deceived versus not-being-deceived and change-in-world versus change-in-belief-only on second-order reasoning ability.
(© 2019 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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