Intentional content in psychopathologies requires an expanded interpretivism.

Autor: Slors M; Faculty of Philosophy,Theology and Religious Studies,Radboud University Nijmegen,6500 HD,Nijmegen,The Netherlands.m.slors@ftr.ru.nld.strijbos@ftr.ru.nlhttps://radboud.academia.edu/MarcSlors/https://radboud.academia.edu/DerekStrijbos/., Francken JC; Department of Psychology,University of Amsterdam,1018 WT, Amsterdam,The Netherlands.j.c.francken@uva.nlwww.jolienfrancken.com., Strijbos D; Faculty of Philosophy,Theology and Religious Studies,Radboud University Nijmegen,6500 HD,Nijmegen,The Netherlands.m.slors@ftr.ru.nld.strijbos@ftr.ru.nlhttps://radboud.academia.edu/MarcSlors/https://radboud.academia.edu/DerekStrijbos/.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: The Behavioral and brain sciences [Behav Brain Sci] 2019 Jan; Vol. 42, pp. e26.
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X18001176
Abstrakt: We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how. Incorporating this practical approach to intentional state ascription in psychopathological cases expands and improves traditional interpretivism.
Databáze: MEDLINE