Distributed cognition criteria: Defined, operationalized, and applied to human-dog systems.

Autor: Amon MJ; Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Colorado Boulder, 1777 Exposition Drive, Boulder, CO, 80301, USA. Electronic address: mary.amon@colorado.edu., Favela LH; Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida, 4111 Pictor Lane, Suite 220, Orlando, FL, 32816-1352, USA; Cognitive Sciences Program, University of Central Florida, 4111 Pictor Lane, Suite 220, Orlando, FL, 32816-1352, USA.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Behavioural processes [Behav Processes] 2019 May; Vol. 162, pp. 167-176. Date of Electronic Publication: 2019 Mar 05.
DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2019.03.001
Abstrakt: Distributed cognition generally refers to situations in which task requirements are shared among multiple agents or, potentially, off-loaded onto the environment. With few exceptions, socially distributed cognition has largely been discussed in terms of intraspecific interactions. This conception fails to capture some forms of group-level cognition among human and non-human animals that are not readily measured or explained in mentalistic or verbal terms. In response to these limitations, we argue for a more stringent set of empirically-verifiable criteria for assessing whether a system is an instance of distributed cognition: interaction-dominant dynamics, agency, and shared task orientation. We apply this framework to humans and working dogs, and contrast the human-dog socially distributed cognitive system with humans using non-biological tools and human interaction with draft animals. The human-dog system illustrates three operationalizable factors for classifying phenomena as socially distributed cognition and extends the framework to interspecies distributed cognition.
(Published by Elsevier B.V.)
Databáze: MEDLINE