Ulysses in the United Kingdom: Difficulties with a capacity-based justification for self-binding in bipolar disorder.
Autor: | Kane NB; Department of Psychological Medicine, King's College Hospital, South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK. |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Zdroj: | Journal of evaluation in clinical practice [J Eval Clin Pract] 2017 Oct; Vol. 23 (5), pp. 1038-1044. |
DOI: | 10.1111/jep.12809 |
Abstrakt: | There has been a recent proposal by Gergel and Owen for introduction of legally enforceable self-binding directives for persons with bipolar affective disorder in the United Kingdom. The model is rooted in presence or absence of decision-making capacity, and the notion of capacity used is an expansion of the usual notion of capacity, in that it is individualized and diachronic. In this article, I argue that an individualized notion of capacity either lacks a coherent foundation or exposes itself to a situation where epistemological error results in a double standard or unjustified enforcement of the directive. I also raise concern that the diachronic notion of capacity leads to an authenticity type account, which fails to incorporate differences in individual prognosis. I then present a rough sketch of an alternative account, more in keeping with current mental health legislation, which uses an individualized notion of "risk to self" to justify self-binding directives in bipolar disorder. (© 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.) |
Databáze: | MEDLINE |
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