Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession.

Autor: Mueller AI; Columbia University, National Bureau of Economic Research, and IZA., Rothstein J; University of California, Berkeley, and National Bureau of Economic Research., von Wachter TM; University of California, Los Angeles, National Bureau of Economic Research, and IZA.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Journal of labor economics [J Labor Econ] 2016 Jan; Vol. 34 (Suppl), pp. S445-S475. Date of Electronic Publication: 2015 Dec 16.
DOI: 10.1086/683140
Abstrakt: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs' recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.
Databáze: MEDLINE
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