The impact of no-fault compensation on health care expenditures: an empirical study of OECD countries.

Autor: Vandersteegen T; Hasselt University, Faculty of Applied Economics, Martelarenlaan 42, BE-3500 Hasselt, Belgium. Electronic address: tom.vandersteegen@uhasselt.be., Marneffe W; Hasselt University, Faculty of Applied Economics, Martelarenlaan 42, BE-3500 Hasselt, Belgium. Electronic address: wim.marneffe@uhasselt.be., Cleemput I; Hasselt University, Faculty of Applied Economics, Martelarenlaan 42, BE-3500 Hasselt, Belgium. Electronic address: irina.cleemput@uhasselt.be., Vereeck L; Hasselt University, Faculty of Applied Economics, Martelarenlaan 42, BE-3500 Hasselt, Belgium. Electronic address: lode.vereeck@uhasselt.be.
Jazyk: angličtina
Zdroj: Health policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands) [Health Policy] 2015 Mar; Vol. 119 (3), pp. 367-74. Date of Electronic Publication: 2014 Sep 28.
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.09.010
Abstrakt: Around the world, governments are faced with spiralling health care expenditures. This raises the need for further insight in the determinants of these expenditures. Existing literature focuses primarily on income, ageing, health care financing and supply variables. This paper includes medical malpractice system characteristics as determinants of health spending in OECD countries. Estimates from our regression models suggest that no-fault schemes for medical injuries with decoupling of deterrence and compensation reduce health expenditures per capita by 0.11%. Furthermore, countries that introduced a no-fault system without decoupling of deterrence and compensation are found to have higher (+0.06%) health care spending.
(Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.)
Databáze: MEDLINE
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