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Summary: As authoritarian states in the MENA region are under increasing international pressure to decentralize political power, Janine A. Clark examines why Morocco initiated a process of decentralization as early as the 1970s while Jordan did not and the impact of their divergent paths. According to the World Bank, political decentralization promises greater democracy and better and more equitable services via the inclusion of civil society actors in municipal decision-making. Clark challenges this and questions: why authoritarian regimes choose to decentralize or not; how municipal actors respond to decentralization reforms; and the extent to which decentralization, as opposed to centralization, stabilizes authoritarian regimes. Based on extensive fieldwork in the two countries, Clark argues that decentralization is a tactic authoritarian regimes use when they seek to expand their societal base of support. She furthermore reveals that municipal actors similarly use decentralization reforms to their advantage. Morocco's decentralization reforms offer regime-supportive municipal actors opportunities to enhance their patron-client ties at the expense of civil society actors. Consequently, decentralization generally has not resulted in greater political inclusivity or improved services but in the entrenchment of pro-regime elites in power. The main Islamist political party also has been able to take advantage of decentralization reforms. Precisely by fulfilling the spirit of the reforms, Islamists have been able to displace pro-regime elites and gain municipal power in partnership with civil society actors. In the end, however, Clark argues, despite some municipal success stories, decentralization reforms consolidate the power of and stabilizes authoritarian regimes. |
