| Autor: |
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter |
| Další autoři: |
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| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Informace o vydání: |
New York : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2010. |
| Předmět: |
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| Druh dokumentu: |
Online; Non-fiction; Electronic document |
| Abstrakt: |
Summary: The commonsense view that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them has been thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. His striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and to have practical implications for criminal justice. Libet's work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research in neuroscience and psychology that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel have brought together prominent experts in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and law to discuss whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other. |
| Databáze: |
Vybrané kolekce e-knih |
| Externí odkaz: |
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