| Abstrakt: |
Abstract: At the beginning of chapter 4 of Individuals (1959), Strawson presents a foreword that might be considered surprising. In this chapter, entitled “Monads,” he pretends to refer to the thought of Leibniz not as of the real Leibniz but of a “possible Leibniz.” He intends to critique the arguments of this Leibniz, considered by him as a partisan of the descriptive metaphysics of particulars - just like he is - in order to strengthen both of his own theses: 1) the foundation of the metaphysics of particulars on their demonstrative designation, and 2) the identification of particulars with bodies. Arguing so, he nonetheless ignores the possibility that Leibniz might not have disagreed with him. Strawson’s attitude therefore suggests to us a methodological issue: Can we address ourselves to a philosopher without precisely referring to his doctrine? In other words, can we neglect the (real) history of philosophy so much that this amounts to underestimating the (disciplinary) history of philosophy? |
