| Abstrakt: |
Abstract: In the first part of the paper, I show that, according to Kant, Leibniz has a false theory of knowledge because it remains on a false theory of time: time would be possible through the connection of determinations of substances; so, time would be a simple relationship between substances that is a determination of the thing in self. Leibniz’s theory of time is presented in the second part of the paper, and I show that, according Leibniz, time is relative, ideal, continuous and, most importantly, a condition of possibility. Time is a sort of frame; that is, a structure for anteriority, posteriority, and simultaneity. Time is not only the order of things, but it is the condition of the order; it is not only a succession of events, but it is the ground of the succession. In the third part, I show the connecting points between Leibniz and Kant: time is a condition of possibility for the objects of experience. I present the argument that the aggregate (the phenomenon) is successive. According Leibniz, only the monad is permanent, so every individual object is a subject of succession. Given that time is, for Kant and for Leibniz, a condition of possibility of the objects of experience as successive existences, it is connected to the idea of continuity. The law of continuity leads both the events, through the passage from one state to another, and the objects, that are the subjects of the changes. The changes of individual things will form a series, so Leibniz is led to the idea of a law of series for each object. Given that inner experience is connected to outer experience through our consciousness, Leibniz, like Kant, can sustain the relationship between inner experience and time. |
