| Abstrakt: |
Abstract: The different past and current interpretations of the notion of individual substance introduced by Leibniz in his Discourse on Metaphysics shed more and more light on this notion, which will be followed by that of Monad. In spite of this notional framework, relative to the Leibnizian substance, it goes through a remarkable evolution, and a common feature of this evolution remains fixed and unchanged:logical possibility. Few analyses point out the importance of this conditio sine qua non of any actual being, of every existence as Leibniz himself says. The present study focuses on the necessity of the principle of contradiction in the analysis of the notion of individual substance during the period of the Discourse of Metaphysics. First, we try to show how logical possibility is required by the real definition of the notion of individual substance in the Discourse of Metaphysics. We then proceed to an explanation of the coupling: logical possibility - non-contradiction. Finally, our analysis leads to the problematic of existence submitted to the divine will and the metaphysical possible submitted to the divine intellect. |
