| Abstrakt: |
Abstract: a1_The complex interplay of external and internal factors of Sovietization and the incorporation of the countries of central and Eastern Europe into the Soviet bloc constitute a frequently disussed topic of early Cold-War history. Recently the document-based picture of how Czechoslovakia was perceived at various levels of Soviet diplomatic, Party, and military institutions has been broadened; few documents, however, are available to provide evidence on direct intervention by the Soviet leaders, such as Stalin´s veto against Czechoslovak participation in Marshall Plan negotiations. At the international conference in Prague the Russian historian Galina Muraško at least partially began to unlock the mystery of the mission to Prague by Valerian Zorin, one of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov´s deputys. Zorin was in Prague from 19 to 25 February 1948, that is, at the height of the government crisis that resulted in the Communist coup d´état and the exclusion of non-Communist coalition partners. Muraško did no have at hand the entire set of documents necessary to come to a definite conclusion about the options open to Zorin and the work he carried out. From the several telegrams between Zorin and Moscow which are now available, it is clear, however, that Moscow wanted the CPCz to proceed more resolutely, and the Kremlin was not afraid to use unconstitutional methods. The newly released documents argue against the currently widespread version, which claims that the Kremlin considered it appropriate for the Soviet Army in Hungary to move towards the frontier with Czechoslovakia or even to enter Czechoslovak territory. It is clear from the telegrams, that the Soviet leadership considered the Soviet demonstration of military might at the frontier with Czechoslovakia, which according to Zorin Premier Gottwald and General Secretary Slánský were demanding, to be inappropriate. |
