| Autor: |
Chang, Kaiju1 (AUTHOR) kchang@nccu.edu.tw, Huang, Hsini1,2,3 (AUTHOR) h.i.huang@fgga.leidenuniv.nl |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Government Information Quarterly. Oct2023, Vol. 40 Issue 4, pN.PAG-N.PAG. 1p. |
| Abstrakt: |
This research explores why and how members of the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) share cybersecurity information to prevent cyber threats in Taiwan, and factors that encourage or discourage this behavior. The literature on information sharing has traditionally emphasized the motives for doing so and/or the structure of the sharing platform/network, leaving a gap in our understanding on how its formal and informal network rules shape, influence, and collide. By applying Ostrom's (2007) institutional analysis and development framework to Taiwanese Regional- and Sectoral-ISACs to qualitative data from 40 in-depth interviews across central/local governments, private companies, state-owned enterprises, and non-governmental organizations, this paper analyzes the institutional rules-in-use at the operational, collective, and constitutional levels. Our qualitative empirical study aims to induct the various institutional rules-in-use embedded in the ISAC networks, and its findings regarding inter-organizational crisis-management information sharing may have implications for cross-boundary participation in other nations. • Establishing ISACs becomes a key strategy for governments to prevent and defend against cyber threats. • We study multi-level institutional rules-in-use and inter-organizational information sharing by applying Ostrom's IAD framework. • Both formal and informal rules-in-use should be considered to understand how ISACs members choose to share or withhold information. • The interplay of formal and informal rules explains cybersecurity information-sharing mechanisms in ISACs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Library, Information Science & Technology Abstracts |
| Externí odkaz: |
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Full Text from ScienceDirect