Managerial Overconfidence and Conference Calls
| Autor: | CHANG, SHU-LING, 張淑玲 |
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| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 106 This study examines the relation between managerial overconfidence and conference calls. Prior studies document that managers consider a variety of costs and benefits when deciding whether to disclosure firm’s material information and this decision is affected by the characteristic of the decision makers. Overconfidence, as an important feature of managers, has become studied in the academic literature in the recent years. Managers tend to be overconfident because they believe that they have more precise knowledge about future events than they actually have. Overconfident managers are apt to convene conference calls since conference call is an important tool to disclose information about future. Therefore, this paper examines how managerial overconfidence affects the occurrence and frequency of conference calls using evidence from Taiwan stock market. I use manager’s purchasing his own firm’s stock over the past 2 years and the average return is negative as the measure of managerial overconfidence basically following Kolasinski and Li (2013). Using data from firm publicly listed in Taiwan for the period from 2005 to 2015, the results provide robust evidence that managerial overconfidence and conference calls is significantly positive correlated. That is, companies with higher managerial overconfidence would be more likely and more frequent to convene conference calls. Prior research of managerial overconfidence was mainly discussing the impact on financing and investing decisions, this study provides further supplementary evidence of the impact on convening conference calls, the managerial decision of disclosure behavior. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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