On the determination of optimal capital structure: Signaling equilibrium and Countersignaling equilibrium
| Autor: | Ming-Feng Wang, 王銘逢 |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Druh dokumentu: | 學位論文 ; thesis |
| Popis: | 92 Ross (1977) argues that under information asymmetry, in order to defer from lower quality firms, high quality firms always use higher debt as external funds. It implies that the higher the expect earnings, the higher the debt issue. Regrettably, some empirical evidence indicates that firm’s debt is not significantly positively associated with firm quality. This paper extends the Ross’s model by introducing the extra information provides by an independent third party. We found out that when the signaling game has extra information, then the signaling equilibrium may be separating or partial-pooling. It means that in the presence of extra information, High quality firms will be correctly identified even it does not use the higher debt. Our result has made a possible explanation for some empirical evidence. |
| Databáze: | Networked Digital Library of Theses & Dissertations |
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