What the Adoption Problem Does Not Show
| Autor: | Camillo Giuliano Fiore |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Análisis Filosófico, Vol 42, Iss 1, Pp 79-103 (2022) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0326-1301 1851-9636 |
| DOI: | 10.36446/af.2022.402 |
| Popis: | Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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