An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks

Autor: Zheng Wang, Shui Yu, Scott Rose
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
Zdroj: EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety, Vol 4, Iss 14, Pp 1-17 (2018)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 2032-9393
DOI: 10.4108/eai.15-5-2018.154771
Popis: The threats of caching poisoning attacks largely stimulate the deployment of DNSSEC. Being a strong but demanding cryptographical defense, DNSSEC has its universal adoption predicted to go through a lengthy transition. Thus the DNSSEC practitioners call for a secure yet lightweight solution to speed up DNSSEC deployment while offering an acceptable DNSSEC-like defense. This paper proposes a new On-Demand Defense (ODD) scheme against cache poisoning attacks, still using but lightly using DNSSEC. In the solution, DNS operates in DNSSEC-oblivious mode unless a potential attack is detected and triggers a switch to DNSSEC-aware mode. The modeling checking results demonstrate that only a small DNSSEC query load is needed by the ODD scheme to ensure a small enough cache poisoning success rate.
Databáze: Directory of Open Access Journals