| Autor: |
Mehrnoush Fanaei, Li Xin Yang |
| Jazyk: |
perština |
| Rok vydání: |
2023 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
حقوق فناوریهای نوین, Vol 4, Iss 8, Pp 227-243 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2783-3836 |
| DOI: |
10.22133/mtlj.2023.387130.1175 |
| Popis: |
With the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI), the legal community has raised various views on the civil rights status of intelligent robots. The main question is whether robots can be granted legal personality. In this study, the status of intelligent robots is examined. By examining the physiological elements of the human body, it can be found that intelligent robots do not have the biological elements of real personhood and do not have real personhood and still fall into the domain of objects and are recognised as legal objects and not real persons. This study provides some suggestions by analysing the various views on the status of intelligent robots in civil law and researching the multiple concepts of personality and the constituent elements of real personhood in civil law. To determine what type of legal status can be considered for intelligent robots, the term "intelligent robot personality", especially human-like robots, is compared with the elements of personality. Based on the results of this comparison, it is found that intelligent robots do not have real and legal personality and cannot be included in the definitions of real and legal personality defined in civil law when determining legal status. Therefore, it is suggested that product liability law be used in this regard. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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