What Is It Like To Be in a Pure Perceptual State?
| Autor: | Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese |
| Rok vydání: | 2024 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Análisis Filosófico, Vol 44, Iss 2, Pp 217-244 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0326-1301 1851-9636 |
| DOI: | 10.36446/af.e1042 |
| Popis: | The idea of pure perception —perception without any cognitive influence— is central to the science and philosophy of perception. For many, to be in a pure perceptual state is to be in a state whose content is nonconceptual, whose format is iconic, and whose phenomenology is unique. This paper explores this possibility and finds that the idea of pure perception, at least when defined in these terms, is untenable. Besides significant specific worries derived from the properties characterizing these states, I have not found empirical grounds indicating the possibility of individuating these states: neither looking inside oneself (introspection), nor looking inside others (psychology), nor looking inside the brain (neuroanatomy), suggests the existence of pure perceptual mental states. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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