BlockScope: Detecting and Investigating Propagated Vulnerabilities in Forked Blockchain Projects
| Autor: | Yi, Xiao, Fang, Yuzhou, Wu, Daoyuan, Jiang, Lingxiao |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| DOI: | 10.14722/ndss.2023.24222 |
| Popis: | Due to the open-source nature of the blockchain ecosystem, it is common for new blockchains to fork or partially reuse the code of classic blockchains. For example, the popular Dogecoin, Litecoin, Binance BSC, and Polygon are all variants of Bitcoin/Ethereum. These "forked" blockchains thus could encounter similar vulnerabilities that are propagated from Bitcoin/Ethereum during forking or subsequently commit fetching. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study of detecting and investigating the propagated vulnerabilities in forked blockchain projects. To facilitate this study, we propose BlockScope, a novel tool that can effectively and efficiently detect multiple types of cloned vulnerabilities given an input of existing Bitcoin/Ethereum security patches. Specifically, BlockScope adopts similarity-based code match and designs a new way of calculating code similarity to cover all the syntax-wide variant (i.e., Type-1, Type-2, and Type-3) clones. Moreover, BlockScope automatically extracts and leverages the contexts of patch code to narrow down the search scope and locate only potentially relevant code for comparison. Our evaluation shows that BlockScope achieves good precision and high recall both at 91.8% (1.8 times higher recall than that in ReDeBug). BlockScope allows us to discover 101 previously unknown vulnerabilities in 13 out of the 16 forked projects of Bitcoin and Ethereum, including 16 from Dogecoin, 6 from Litecoin, 1 from Binance, and 4 from Optimism. We have reported all the vulnerabilities to their developers; 40 of them have been patched or accepted, 66 were acknowledged or under pending, and only 4 were rejected. We further investigate the propagation and patching processes of discovered vulnerabilities, and reveal three types of vulnerability propagation from source to forked projects, as well as the long delay (over 200 days) for releasing patches in Bitcoin forks. Comment: The paper was accepted by ISOC NDSS 2023 |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
|