Equilibria in Repeated Games with Countably Many Players and Tail-Measurable Payoffs

Autor:	Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, Flesch, Janos, Predtetchinski, Arkadi, Solan, Eilon
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Mathematics - Optimization and Control Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	We prove that every repeated game with countably many players, finite action sets, and tail-measurable payoffs admits an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon > 0$.
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.03975 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv