Contest Architecture with Public Disclosures

Autor:	Hinnosaar, Toomas
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	Economics - Theoretical Economics Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Economics - General Economics
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest designer. While different objectives involve different trade-offs, I show that under many circumstances the optimal contest is one of the three basic contest structures widely studied in the literature: simultaneous, first-mover, or sequential contest.
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.11004 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv