The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game

Autor:	Briata, Federica, Dall'Aglio, Andrea, Dall'Aglio, Marco, Fragnelli, Vito
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	Mathematics - Optimization and Control Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory 91A12 91B14
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
DOI:	10.1007/s10479-017-2651-8
Popis:	In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by Knaster (1946). In this paper we analyze the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the game and propose its use as a measure of the players' attitude towards collusion. Furthermore, we relate the sign of the Shapley value with the ranking order of the players' evaluation, and show that some players in a given ranking will always deter collusion. Finally, we characterize the coalitions that maximize the gain from collusion, and suggest an ad-hoc coalition formation mechanism. Comment: 20 pages, 1 table. This new version corrects some mistakes and improves the layout
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.08068 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv