| Autor: |
Cechlárová, Katarína, Eirinakis, Pavlos, Fleiner, Tamás, Magos, Dimitrios, Manlove, David, Mourtos, Ioannis, Oceláková, Eva, Rastegari, Baharak |
| Rok vydání: |
2015 |
| Předmět: |
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| Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
| Popis: |
We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the most general setting examined so far in the literature, our work unifies and generalizes several known results. Specifically, we characterize POMs and introduce the \emph{Generalized Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties (GSDT)} that effectively handles ties via properties of network flows. We show that GSDT can generate all POMs using different priority orderings over the applicants, but it satisfies truthfulness only for certain such orderings. This shortcoming is not specific to our mechanism; we show that any mechanism generating all POMs in our setting is prone to strategic manipulation. This is in contrast to the one-to-one case (with or without ties), for which truthful mechanisms generating all POMs do exist. |
| Databáze: |
arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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