| Autor: |
Brien, Spencer T., Eger, Robert J. III |
| Přispěvatelé: |
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), Graduate School of Defense Management (GSDM) |
| Rok vydání: |
2020 |
| Popis: |
Draft: Do not cite without author permission The (draft) article of record as published may be found at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562735 Cooperative budgeting arrangements between state and local governments jointly fund local programs. The mix of state and local revenues contributed to these arrangements can change as budget priorities shift over time. This study examines the strategic choices public officials make as they determine their contributions to jointly-funded programs. Using a game theory model known as the “Diner’s Dilemma”, the analysis explores how each level of government considers how much revenue to contribute and whether it can induce its partner to increase their level of support. This analysis applies primarily to local programs with regional externalities. The model illustrates how local efforts to aggressively try to shift costs to the state government can backfire, particularly during periods of state fiscal stress. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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