Asymmetries in rent seeking
| Autor: | Dari-Mattiacci, G., Langlais, E., Lovat, B., Parisi, F., Congleton, R.D., Hillman, A.L. |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (FdR, FEB), ACLE (FdR), Finance (ABS, FEB) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Zdroj: | Companion to the political economy of rent seeking, 73-92 STARTPAGE=73;ENDPAGE=92;TITLE=Companion to the political economy of rent seeking |
| Popis: | In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players’ efforts and probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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