Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker

Autor:	Sanjay Bhattacherjee, Palash Sarkar
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Statistics and Probability Economics and Econometrics Theoretical computer science Computer science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Weighted voting ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Mathematics (miscellaneous) Goods and services Schema (psychology) Voting 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory 050207 economics Statistics Probability and Uncertainty QA Social Sciences (miscellaneous) media_common
Zdroj:	International Journal of Game Theory. 50:279-295
ISSN:	1432-1270 0020-7276
DOI:	10.1007/s00182-020-00751-z
Popis:	The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council of India has a non-conventional weighted voting procedure having a primary player who is a blocker and a set of secondary players. The voting weights are not fixed and are determined based on the subset of players which participate in the voting. We introduce the notion of voting schema to formally model such a voting procedure. Individual voting games arise from a voting schema depending on the subset of secondary players who participate in the voting. We make a detailed formal study of the trade-off between the minimal sizes of winning and blocking coalitions in the voting games that can arise from a voting schema. Finally, the GST voting procedure is assessed using the theoretical results leading to suggestions for improvement.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ede2a758e54e6cc6ad3d8876ad58405d https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00751-z Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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