The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets

Autor: Justin Dijk, Bert Willems
Přispěvatelé: Environmental Economics, Research Group: Economics, Department of Economics
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2011
Předmět:
Zdroj: Dijk, J J & Willems, B 2011, ' The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets ', Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 1764-1773 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.008
Energy Policy, 39(3), 1764-1773. Elsevier BV
Energy Policy, 39(3), 1764-1773. ELSEVIER SCI LTD
ISSN: 0301-4215
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.008
Popis: In a competitive electricity market, nodal pricing is the most efficient way to manage congestion. Counter-trading is inefficient as it gives the wrong long term signals for entry and exit of power plants. However, in a non-competitive market, additional entry will improve the competitiveness of the market, and will increase social benefit by reducing price-cost margins. This paper studies whether the potential pro-competitive entry effects could make counter-trading more efficient than nodal pricing. We find that this is unlikely to be the case, and expect counter-trading to have a negative effect on overall welfare. The potential benefits of additional competition (more competitive prices and lower production cost) do not outweigh the distortions (additional investment cost for the entrant, and socialization of the congestion cost to final consumers). © 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
Databáze: OpenAIRE