Corporate hedging, family firms, and CEO identity

Autor:	Ottorino MORRESI, Massimiliano Barbi
Přispěvatelé:	Barbi, M., Morresi, O., Barbi, Massimiliano, Morresi, Ottorino, Barbi, M, Morresi, O
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	History Polymers and Plastics Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) CEO tenure Hedging Business and International Management hedging Family generation Family firm Founder CEO Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Zdroj:	SSRN Electronic Journal.
ISSN:	1556-5068
DOI:	10.2139/ssrn.4101036
Popis:	We study the propensity to hedge of closely-held family-managed firms. Family involvement in CEO positions positively affects the likelihood of hedging. The effect is stronger when the CEO belongs to the founding family, especially for long-tenured and founder CEOs. This evidence is consistent with the higher conservatism of family agents, aimed at protecting socioemotional wealth and avoiding loss of reputation and control. Information asymmetry and, more mildly, underdiversification increase the propensity to hedge. Corporate governance attributes proxying agency issues are not significant.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::db61f10529f5e84766c4ce9fe9a1dab7 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4101036 Zobrazit plný text záznamu