Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets
| Autor: | Fabiano Schivardi, Nicola Pavanini, Gregory S. Crawford |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Department of Finance, Research Group: Finance, University of Zurich, Crawford, Gregory S |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Counterfactual thinking
Economics and Econometrics lending markets Asymmetric information Kreditmarkt adverse selection jel:D82 Adverse selection 2002 Economics and Econometrics Monetary economics assymetric information Unvollständige Konkurrenz jel:G21 ECON Department of Economics Italian banking Information asymmetry 10007 Department of Economics 0502 economics and business ddc:330 Economics imperfect competition Market power credit markets 050207 economics 050205 econometrics L13 Asymmetric information imperfect competition lending markets Italian banking adverse selection business.industry 05 social sciences Small business 330 Economics Asymmetrische Information D82 jel:G14 Loan jel:L13 Default G21 business Imperfect competition |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Review, 108(7), 1659-1701. American Economic Association |
| ISSN: | 0002-8282 |
| Popis: | We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian lending market. We show that banks' optimal price response to an increase in adverse selection varies with competition. Exploiting matched data on loans and defaults, we estimate models of demand for credit, loan use, pricing, and firm default. We find evidence of adverse selection and evaluate its importance. While indeed prices rise in competitive markets and decline in concentrated ones, the former effect dominates, suggesting that while market power can mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric information, mainstream concerns about its effects survive with imperfect competition. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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