The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence
| Autor: | Anders Poulsen, Odile Poulsen, Zoe Bett |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Focal point Welfare economics Compromise media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Conflict of interest General Social Sciences Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics Applied Psychology Coordination failure 050205 econometrics media_common Inequity aversion |
| Popis: | We experimentally investigate if subjects in a tacit coordination situation with a conflict of interest tend to choose an equal compromise, even if it is strictly dominated. The data show that this is the case, as long as the compromise payoffs are not too low. Game comparisons suggest that choosing a dominated compromise is a focal point that allows subjects to avoid a costly coordination failure. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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