The Effect of Group Identity on Hiring Decisions With Incomplete Information
| Autor: | Fortuna Casoria, Christina Rott, Ernesto Reuben |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), New York University [Abu Dhabi], NYU System (NYU), Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam [Amsterdam] (VU), Management and Organisation, Tinbergen Institute, Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
SDG 16 - Peace
group identity adverse selection Strategy and Management Management Science and Operations Research JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J7 - Labor Discrimination/J.J7.J71 - Discrimination JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments Identity Discrimination JEL: M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M51 - Firm Employment Decisions • Promotions 0502 economics and business ddc:330 D91 050207 economics [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance J71 050208 finance SDG 16 - Peace Justice and Strong Institutions 05 social sciences SDG 10 - Reduced Inequalities Hiring [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Labor Justice and Strong Institutions D82 Economics: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory hiring 8. Economic growth JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design discrimination |
| Zdroj: | Management Science, 68(8), 6336-6345. INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences Casoria, F, Reuben, E & Rott, C 2022, ' The Effect of Group Identity on Hiring Decisions with Incomplete Information ', Management Science, vol. 68, no. 8, pp. 6336-6345 . https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4462 |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 0025-1909 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.3731536 |
| Popis: | We investigate the effects of group identity on hiring decisions with adverse selection problems. We run a laboratory experiment in which employers cannot observe a worker’s ability or verify the veracity of the ability the worker claims to have. We evaluate whether sharing an identity results in employers discriminating in favor of ingroup workers and whether it helps workers and employers overcome the adverse selection problem. We induce identities using the minimal group paradigm and study two settings: one in which workers cannot change their identity and one in which they can. Although sharing a common identity does not make the worker’s claims more honest, employers strongly discriminate in favor of ingroup workers when identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers’ beliefs and, hence, seems to be taste-based. When possible, few workers change their identity. However, the mere possibility of changing identities erodes the employers’ trust toward ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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