In the shadow of sunshine regulation: Explaining disclosure biases
| Autor: | Géraldine Pflieger, Thomas Bolognesi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
ddc:333.7-333.9
Transaction cost Actuarial science Public Administration Sociology and Political Science Performance management ddc:354.3 05 social sciences Disclosure Public management 050601 international relations 0506 political science Information asymmetry ddc:320 Opportunism 050602 political science & public administration Business Performance indicator Law Organization Regulation Shadow (psychology) |
| Zdroj: | Regulation and Governance, Vol. 15, No 1 (2021) pp. 200-225 |
| ISSN: | 1748-5991 1748-5983 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/rego.12286 |
| Popis: | Performance reporting in sunshine regulation is subjected to disclosure biases, because agents may game the regulation or encounter difficulties in complying. These biases limit the appraisal of the impact of sunshine regulation on performance. We investigate the behavioral causes of such disclosure biases by focusing on transaction cost economizing and opportunism. We provide an original methodology to take into account information asymmetries in principal–agent relationships. We focus on water utilities management in France. Our data set includes 795 observations covering water utilities and performance indicators characteristics. It allows for comparisons of revealed and observed performances and identifies different types of disclosure biases. Findings indicate that opportunism is a significant motivation for disclosure biases, while, unexpectedly, transaction costs are not a direct trigger of disclosure biases. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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