Managerial Delegation and Conflicting Interest in Unionized Duopoly with Firm Heterogeneity

Autor:	Jen yao Lee, Chien-Shu Tsai, Po-Sheng Ko, Shih-shen Chen
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	General Mathematics Computer Science (miscellaneous) Engineering (miscellaneous) unionized oligopoly firm heterogeneity managerial delegation stakeholders
Zdroj:	Mathematics; Volume 10; Issue 22; Pages: 4201
ISSN:	2227-7390
Popis:	This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s heterogeneity scale will cause industry profit, union utility, consumer surplus and manager bonus conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the intensity of conflict is lower between the industry and the union than between the industry and consumer and between the industry and manager if the degree of heterogeneity is relatively small.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b4c6c9cd050e034bf86925bda034083d https://doi.org/10.3390/math10224201 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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