Dynastic control without ownership: Evidence from post-war Japan
| Autor: | Morten Bennedsen, Vikas Mehrotra, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Jungwook Shim |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
040101 forestry
Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Corporate governance Strategy and Management 05 social sciences Control (management) Equity (finance) 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Market economy Accounting 0502 economics and business Post war 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Demographic economics Business Finance |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial Economics. 142:831-843 |
| ISSN: | 0304-405X |
| Popis: | Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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