Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence
| Autor: | Odile Poulsen, Melanie Parravano |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject Asymmetry Microeconomics symbols.namesake Coordination game coordination labels focal point stake size payoff asymmetry Mathematics media_common jel:C70 jel:C92 Focal point Labels jel:C72 ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING Mode (statistics) TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Contrast (statistics) Payoff asymmetry Cardinal point Nash equilibrium Coordination symbols Symmetry (geometry) Stake size Mathematical economics Finance |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 94:191-199 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.001 |
| Popis: | We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008). These findings suggest that players’ mode of reasoning, and the extent to which it can be explained by team reasoning or a level-k model, crucially depends on the symmetry or asymmetry of the coordination payoffs. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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