MinimaLT : Minimal-latency networking through better security
| Autor: | Tanja Lange, W. Michael Petullo, Xu Zhang, Jon A. Solworth, Daniel J. Bernstein |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Discrete Mathematics, Coding Theory and Cryptology |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Authentication
business.industry Computer science Network security Network packet ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS Denial-of-service attack Cryptography ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Encryption Computer security computer.software_genre Key (cryptography) business Communications protocol computer Computer network |
| Zdroj: | Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'13, Berlin, Germany, November 4-8, 2013), 425-438 STARTPAGE=425;ENDPAGE=438;TITLE=Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'13, Berlin, Germany, November 4-8, 2013) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
| Popis: | Minimal Latency Tunneling (MinimaLT) is a new network protocol that provides ubiquitous encryption for maximal confidentiality, including protecting packet headers. MinimaLT provides server and user authentication, extensive Denial-of-Service protections, and IP mobility while approaching perfect forward secrecy. We describe the protocol, demonstrate its performance relative to TLS and unencrypted TCP/IP, and analyze its protections, including its resilience against DoS attacks [56]. By exploiting the properties of its cryptographic protections, MinimaLT is able to eliminate three-way handshakes and thus create connections faster than unencrypted TCP/IP. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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