Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets

Autor: Emmanuel Petrakis, Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy
Přispěvatelé: Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna (UNIBO), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP ), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), University of Crete [Heraklion] (UOC), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid [Madrid] (UC3M), Bacchiega, Emanuele, Bonroy, Olivier, Petrakis, Emmanuel
Rok vydání: 2020
Předmět:
Exclusive vs non exclusive relationships
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure
Firm Strategy
and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
media_common.quotation_subject
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure
Firm Strategy
and Market Performance/L.L1.L14 - Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
Tariff
ComputerApplications_COMPUTERSINOTHERSYSTEMS
Bottleneck
0502 economics and business
ddc:330
Common value auction
auctions
Vertical relationships
050207 economics
Industrial organization
050205 econometrics
Downstream (petroleum industry)
media_common
Upstream (petroleum industry)
L13
L14
050208 finance
Auctions
business.industry
exclusive vs. non-exclusive relationships
05 social sciences
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure
Pricing
and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
SECS-P/01 Economia politica
Negotiation
Bargaining power
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
Vertical relationships Exclusive vs. non-exclusive relationships Auctions
English auction
business
Welfare
D43
Finance
Zdroj: Economics Letters
Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2020, 192 (July), ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198⟩
Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier ; Petrakis, Emmanuel (2020) Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/6355 . In: Quaderni-Working Paper DSE (1145). ISSN 2282-6483.
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198
Popis: International audience; In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bargaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally, in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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